WH/SA #64-749

15 October 1964

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: CUBAN DEFECTOR [redacted] Operation
Briefing in Guatemala of Chief of State Peralta 24 11

1. The briefing was held in a small luxurious government conference room on the afternoon of Friday 6 October 1964, lasting about 2 1/2 hours. Chief of State Colonel Peralta, Minister of Government Colonel Serrano and Intelligence Chief Colonel Porras attended for the Guatemalans. [redacted] TWO CIA OFFICERS WERE PRESENT 06, 08, 06, 08, 24

2. At the request of the SENIOR CIA OFFICER [redacted] I prefaced the operational briefing with a brief description of how the U.S. Intelligence community operates, of the role of CIA, of the need for compartmentation and security, and specifically of how the foregoing considerations make it imperative for the Guatemalans to adopt security precautions which will ensure that the information we provide and the joint operations we undertake are compartmented within the Guatemalan government (and, in fact, discussed by the Guatemalan government exclusively with our representatives in the field). 24

3. Following the introductory remarks outlined above, I briefed the group on the DGI structure, the DGI operational techniques, and specifically on DGI aims and operations in Guatemala. The president lent close attention throughout the briefing and examined the exhibits closely, including the DGI intelligence requirements for Guatemala and the Salvadoran "Caso Zapote" file. 11

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4. After the foregoing exposition, I explained our aims in exploiting the information [redacted]. In this connection I asked for close cooperation and coordination of activities, promising that we shall do our utmost and making reference to our travel lists and watch list.

h. The effectiveness of his own actions against guerrillas in Guatemala and his determination to "meet violence with violence;"

i. Recognition of the importance of the information covered in the briefing and of its exploitation;

j. Reference to the case of the Mexican courier working for Cuban intelligence and now detained in Guatemala [redacted]

k. Acceptance of security restrictions and his decision to hold the information to those present.

7. In replying to the remarks of Colonel Peralta, I said that we appreciate the cooperation of Guatemala in the OAS and that we shall be most interested in the exploitation of the possibilities in the present case. I added that the matter of using force against Cuba is a policy matter on which I was not competent to comment but that the decisions made by the United States Government are based on careful study of detailed information including information on Soviet intentions and capabilities.

8. At the conclusion of the meeting, Peralta asked for a copy of the DGI requirements (which he already had gone over closely) and took the copy with him to study further.

[redacted]

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2. With reference to [redacted] case, because of the developments and plans in El Salvador, I explained briefly the status of the DALTON case and the possibility of his being transferred to Guatemala. (This was in line with the discussion in El Salvador which included our [redacted] the President and the President's intelligence advisor, Colonel MEDRANO.) I asked that the Guatemalan government take no action unless requested by President RIVERA or Colonel MEDRANO and said that, if DALTON is transferred, one of our people probably would talk to DALTON in Guatemala.

3. The Chief of State Peralta made a rather impassioned speech in which he covered the following points:

a. His own long experience in the OAS, in Cuba and in Central America;

b. His early warnings about Castro--which were disregarded;

c. The extent to which Guatemala has lived up to its obligations in the OAS; to which it has cooperated in efforts against Castro; and to which it has looked toward U. S. leadership;

d. The failure of the U. S. to take aggressive action against Cuba and the need for taking a hard line, including the use of force in support of military activity by the free Cubans and the other American countries;

e. His appreciation that the Soviets will not be willing to risk a nuclear war over Cuba;

f. Condemnation of Mexico for her dealings with Cuba, for failure to abide by her obligations in the OAS, and for permitting the Castroites to operate out of Mexico against other American countries;

g. The need for action against Mexico;

SECRET

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